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The two giant Asian neighbours—India and China—have
been facing much the same problems but  experimenting
with different strategies when it comes to addressing their
water issues and the management of their public and
private irrigation infrastructure. China’s experimentation
with alternative institutional arrangements has the
potential to offer options to India’s equally complex
surface and groundwater irrigation economies.
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Improving performance and financial viability
of irrigation systems in India and China
China and India face similar challenges in managing their irrigation economies. Both are developing nations
with large agricultural populations, high population densities and a high proportion of agriculture under
irrigation. Both are facing challenges in financing existing irrigation systems in the face of broader economic
reforms. And in both countries, groundwater provides a particular challenge since it is a major source of
irrigation, but with accelerating declines in both quantity and quality.
Problems in financing surface irrigation systems, worries about continued groundwater table declines along
with cost implications for both farmers and the energy industry, and a range of other issues have raised
serious concerns over the future sustainability of irrigated systems and food security. As a result, there is
now near unanimous agreement in both countries on the need to formulate practical strategies to manage
the future of their irrigation economies.
India and China are trying different paths when responding to their water problems and the management of
public and private irrigation infrastructure.  Yet, China’s experience with alternative institutional arrangements
could provide useful direction to India’s equally complex surface and groundwater irrigation systems.
Moving from water development to IWRM— the
challenge of irrigation management in India
The central management of irrigation by bureaucracies
has been a failure in many countries. For example, in India,
public irrigation systems have fallen far short of their
planned potential: they irrigate smaller areas than they were
designed to; deteriorate year by year because they receive
significantly less investment than is needed for their
maintenance; and they have become a drag on state finances.
Many resource-strapped governments are more than eager
to shed themselves of responsibility for the management of
public irrigation projects.  Yet, the shift in thinking from
bureaucratic to farmer management of irrigation systems
has been a particularly difficult challenge.
Farmer communities in irrigation management
schemes
Discussions on finding solutions to this problem have
tended to focus on Participatory Irrigation Management
(PIM) and Irrigation Management Transfer (IMT) processes.
While there are small islands of excellence, there is no
evidence that PIM will provide a solution on a large enough
scale. In fact, studies of PIM and IMT models in Asia and
Africa have shown that they have not provided the desired
solutions.   After over 20 years experience with PIM and IMT,
old questions still remain unanswered:  Does farmer
management ensure a better quality of irrigation service?
Does it mean more efficient water distribution between head
and tail reaches?  Does it result in improved productivity of
irrigation water at the system level?  And does it ease the
financial burden on the State?
Energy-irrigation nexus
In India, power subsidies to the agriculture sector, used
largely to pump groundwater, have hurt the country’s energy
economy.  The subsidizing of electricity rates is believed to
be the prime reason; so many state electricity boards are on
the verge of bankruptcy.
Key challenges to rationalizing electricity pricing are the
huge transactions costs of collecting charges based on
metered use, and the politically sensitive issue of large
numbers of livelihoods being dependent on groundwater.
Most Indian states have done away with metering and
adopted a flat tariff based on the horsepower rating of
pumps. Thus, farmers do not experience the scarcity value
of groundwater resource, nor the true cost to the society of
providing them the energy required to pump it.  Energy
subsidies create perverse incentives in groundwater
irrigation. For example in Uttar Pradesh or North Bihar
where groundwater is abundantly available, the cost of a
cubic metre of groundwater is around Rs. 4-5. In contrast, it
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or more. In Tamil Nadu, where groundwater resources are
scarce, the cost is minimal to the farmer due to free
electricity.
Regulation and management
Groundwater has become the mainstay of Indian
agriculture as a result of the inability of public irrigation
systems to cater to irrigation needs.  India is yet to find a
practical solution to the problem of groundwater draft
exceeding long-term recharge, exacerbated by the view of
existing policy that groundwater in many regions is a
resource that requires further development and utilization.
Due to its localized nature, the growth of groundwater use
via wells and tube wells tends to get noticed in an area only
after it begins to result in a major decline in groundwater
tables. The groundwater economy is untrammeled by any
regulatory authority or mediating agency—permitting no
role for even the village-level governance structure of gram
panchayats (village councils).
Although groundwater experts continue to exhort the
need to have strong legislation and regulation to prevent
over-usage, many researchers believe that direct regulation
is impossible due to the cost and difficulty of enforcing
regulations on the approximately 20 million pump owners
in India who are scattered over a vast area, with as many as
0.8-1 million new users added annually. Neither India nor
any of its South Asian neighbours has in place a system of
registering water users, nor do they have strong legal
frameworks regarding groundwater and irrigation.
Policy Responses
Although India has had little success with the PIM/IMT
model, the focus of government, NGOs and donors continues
to be on concepts and methods such as organizing
communities, forming Water User Associations (WUA),
capacity building, empowerment, and creating the right
processes. Reforms have had little engagement with nuts and
bolts issues of managerial rewards and incentives, clarifying
roles and responsibilities, bureaucratic accountability, and
above all, in getting results in terms of improved services,
better fee collection, and ‘more crop per drop’.
The potential of China’s “Bounded Service
Provider” model
By focusing on creating an incentive-based model like the
“Bounded Service Providers”, China’s reforms seem focused
on results, ensuring that managers bring a serious intent of
running a profitable water business for the long haul.  A study
of 25 villages in the Chinese provinces of Hebei, Henan,
Shaanxi, Liaoning and Jiangsu during two field visits in 2002
and 2003 and more recent follow up showed that North China
has achieved a significant measure of success with variants of
a model best described as a “Bounded Service Provider” which
is operated by farmers turned irrigation entrepreneurs.
This model involves a local entrepreneur, bureaucrat or
economic entity being provided incentives to perform a role
assigned to him or her within a boundary established by a village
committee. This is not to say that the “Bounded Service Provider”
system is the only one in use in China. In fact, China experimented
with many different types of irrigation management systems,
including PIM, over the last several decades, in tune with the
changing policies of its government. Before sweeping economic
reforms of the Deng administration in 1978, collectives throughout
China were responsible for making and maintaining tube wells,
pumps and distribution systems. Since then, a variety of systems
have come into play.
For example, in parts of Henan province, where water tables are
high and the operation of tube wells inexpensive, the system is similar
to that in India, with village committees still owning bore holes but
farmers bringing their own pumps. But in areas of Hebei, Shaanxi
and Shandong provinces, where deep tube wells are required, marked
changes have taken place in village irrigation management. With deep
tube wells serving large areas of 40-70 hectares each, construction
costs are beyond the means of average farmers. It is common for the
tube wells to be built and owned by the village development
committee, often by using accumulated savings, borrowings, or
imposing new taxes. Increasingly, these village committees are inviting
private investments, usually from farmers themselves, to build and
operate tube wells.
Variations in the “Bounded Service Provider” system are
found from village to village in aspects of the identification of
the service provider, management fee, responsibility of the
service provider, role of the village committee, and impact of
the system.
Identification of the service provider
In almost all cases, bounded service providers are found
from among the most entrepreneurial men and women of
the village farmers. In a few villages, the management
contract was auctioned to the highest bidder. But in most
instances, the procedure involved informal negotiation
between prospective candidates and the village committee
and/or the township water bureau.  Some of the service
providers were women, although the majority by far were
men. Where township water bureaus had set up expensive
drip or sprinkler irrigation systems, the management
contracts had been secured by the village leaders themselves.
Determination of irrigation fees
In most cases, the village committee remained responsible
for maintenance and repairs, while the manager was
responsible for water distribution and fee collection. The
irrigation fee is invariably determined by the village
committee and/or the township water bureau, a distinctive
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of pumping or kWh of electricity used and range from
lucrative where new drip or sprinkler systems were in use,
to low in villages where there was significant pressure from
farmers to keep fees low. Periods of management contracts
range from 5 to 20 years. Fees are also dependant on the
contribution of the provider to capital costs, i.e. the higher
the share of costs by the provider, the less of a say the village
committee would have, and/or the longer the term of the
contract to the provider.
Participation of entrepreneurial managers in
China’s large irrigation systems
In the large irrigation systems, entrepreneurial
management is becoming more and more common in the
operation and management of canals, water distribution
and water fee collection, which had earlier been the
responsibility of village committees or collectives. From
1995 to 2001, the proportion of villages with collective
management fell from 100 percent to 27 percent in a sample
of villages surveyed by Wang et al (2005).
Of these, twice as many employed private contractors
as formed WUAs. In fact, many WUAs were found to be a
method by which a village leader would take control of the
management. A study in 51 villages in Ningxia and Henan
water in relation to the water entitlement that is
determined for each village by district irrigation officials
before each cropping season.
Thus contractors induced more efficient water use
because of the manner of incentives they faced. They
were charged for a given volume of water but farmers
paid them based on the area irrigated. As a result, if
contractors irrigated more area with the same water,
they earned more. Moreover, incentivized irrigation
managers have begun to worry about farmers turning
to groundwater irrigation in the face of poor quality
surface irrigation service; and increasing use of
groundwater has led to competition in the delivery of
the village water, forcing the surface system to improve
its water delivery services.
provinces in 2002 found that water use per hectare is lower
in villages with incentivized management of large irrigation
systems, by as much as 40 percent. The study also found
that water saving by ‘incentivized’ managers did not
significantly reduce yields of major agricultural products.
Yields of maize and rice were largely unaffected, although
wheat yields declined by 10 percent.
Providing greater incentives to contractors through fees
Contractors receive a part of the basic fee, but they are
also able to increase their incomes through the saving of
South Asia North China
Ownership of tube wells Private Collective, contracted
Ownership of pumps Overwhelmingly private Mostly private, mostly collective
Do all farmers own pumps? No No
Do tube well command areas overlap? Yes, extensively No, rarely
Do pump owners compete to increase Yes, because of active markets in No, because tube wells are sited
water sales? pump irrigation service with to serve specific command areas
powerful productivity and equity
impacts
Are water prices fixed by the operation Yes, entirely; there is no regulation No, it is guided by a village
market? whatever of the way fragmented, committee and village leader;
local pump irrigation markets function usually, it is fixed on
energy-cost plus basis
Is water selling viewed as a source of Yes, especially in Eastern India, No, except in deep tube well
areas significant income? Nepala terai and Bangaldesh
where farmers make heavy
investments
Irrigation cost as a proportion of total 20–25% for water buyers 10–15% for water buyers
value of output
Table 1. Comparing Features of Village Groundwater Economies in South Asia and North China
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demand
Compared to many South Asian countries, China has been
more proactive in groundwater regulation although its
experience is by no means completely satisfactory. It has
experimented with a combination of tube well permits,
withdrawal permits, differential and penal pricing, direct
regulation and sealing of wells, creating alternative water
supplies, and promoting water saving technologies. This
strategy has proven more effective with industry than
agriculture, and in richer provinces than poorer ones.
Tube well permits
Tube well permits provide a mechanism to check
unplanned growth in groundwater wells. However, this has
not begun to work as yet as farmers can get permits easily.
However, the system of permits does serve to provide data
on the number of tube wells in an area, an important aspect
in over-exploited areas.
Withdrawal permits
The most direct method of intervention—withdrawal
permits—registers users, levies fees, allocates quotas, and
 South Asia       China
Does the village government have a significant regulatory role? No, except in Yes
Baluchistan
Are there significant taxes on agriculture?  Are these collected? No Yes
Is there a system of registering and licensing groundwater No Yes, but not
structures? Is it enforced? enforced strictly
What’s the nature of the water bureaucracy? Fragmented; thin Less fragmented,
presence but more presence
Water is an economic good: Does water command No, most users Yes, most users
an economic price? pay a tax pay a water price.
Does the water administration have the capability to enforce No Yes, rice cultivation
broad-spectrum measures? in NCP completed
eliminated.
Are there institutional limits to “competitive deepening of Only indirect; Avoided easily, even
tubewells”? unenforced with privatization
Adoption of water saving methods and technologies Very limited Extensive and growing
Macro economic safety valves:Is there scope for shift of No, except in Yes, with the work
population from farm to off-farm livelihoods? small pockets permit system liberalized
Institutional reform: is the focus just on cost recovery, or Focus on cost Chinese water admin.
productivity and environment sustainability? recovery through IMT in a ‘franchise mode’
rather than IMT
monitors actual usage. First introduced by water bureaus as
far back as the 1970s, it received legislative support by a 1993
regulation—“Implementation Method of Water Withdrawal
Permit System”—which made mandatory the registration of
any individual or entity that draws water from a lake, river or
groundwater over certain levels.
The Water Law of 2002 further required all old and new
tube wells to have Withdrawal Permits. However,
implementation has been slow.  In general, Withdrawal
Permits have yet to achieve significant regulation of
groundwater demand for irrigation. However, it is evident
that institutions such as water companies, irrigation
districts and village committees respond faster and more
readily to regulation than individual users. For example,
of 23,800 permits issued in Shaanxi, over 10,000 are to
industrial users, irrigation districts, and water supply
companies.
Indirect approaches to demand management
Groundwater demand for irrigation in some parts of rural
China is facing downward pressure because of wider trends
not related to programs and strategies implemented by water
administrators.  A major factor has been the global drop in
the price of rice in recent years.
Table  2. Comparing Water Institutions and Policies in South Asia and China: Summary
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The global decline in rice prices, the rise in prices of
electricity, and the need for greater amounts of fertilizer and
labour in rice cultivation, have encouraged the growth of
other crops, most notably maize. With the cultivation of
maize being rain-fed, as compared to the irrigation-intensive
rice, Liaoning Province officials report that groundwater use
in agriculture has fallen and water tables have risen from an
average depth of 34 metres to an average depth of 18 metres.
Bt Cotton versus maize-wheat
The cultivation of Bt (bacillus thuringiensis)cotton also
helps to support the protection of groundwater resources,
since it requires only one to two irrigations per crop as
compared to four to six for maize. Cotton also responds
very well in terms of increased yield to drip irrigation,
which uses far less water. The increased use of plastic mulch
serves to reduce evaporation and preserve moisture. All
these factors result in significant savings for farmers in
terms of electricity and water costs.
Groundwater irrigation and the energy
economy – managing costs
In contrast to India, electricity use in groundwater
irrigation is not a major issue in China. A survey of nine villages
in Henan and Hebei provinces in 2002 showed that irrigation
cost as a proportion of gross value of output, rises in tandem
with the depth from which the groundwater is pumped. The
Chinese power supply industry operates on the principles of
total cost recovery—with each user paying according to
metered usage. Unlike in South Asia, rural users were charged
at a higher rate than urban ones, and until a few years ago,
agriculture even paid higher rates than industrial users.
China’s strong village-level authority structure makes
metering practical and firmly discourages tampering by users.
The passing of costs down to the users makes it impossible
for power suppliers to incur losses. The standard arrangement
is for the village committee and/or township electricity bureau
to train one farmer as part-time electrician with dual
responsibilities of maintaining the power supply infrastructure
in the village and collecting user charges. Usage is based on
meters, with one meter at the user’s location and the other at
the transformer. Issues dealing with non-tallying of the two
meters have been largely solved by allowing a 10 percent loss
due to leakage, and a modernization program by the Electricity
Network Reform Program that resulted in losses falling sharply.
And last but not least, the incentive given to village electricians
to keep losses to less than 10 percent, is a powerful tool for
them to reduce line losses.
Meanwhile, China is coming full circle, by turning over to
county electricity bureaus, the responsibility of electricity
plants, transmission and distribution infrastructure, and
Table  3. Issues in the Agricultural Water-Energy Nexus:
China versus India
China India
Energy fees proportional to use Yes No
Cost recovery in energy provision Yes No
Operator incentive for water
efficiency and fee collection Yes No
Strong energy management
oversight from village authorities Yes No
Water-Energy Nexus is considered
an unresolved issue No Yes
collection of dues from users. It is expected that China will
begin to face many of the problems in user fee recovery that
Indian State Electricity Boards (SEBs) are trying to overcome.
China is already trying certain methods to overcome
these hurdles. One that is proving successful is a pre-paid
card or IC card system where users pay for electricity in
advance on a rechargeable card. This system has been
introduced in the water-short provinces.  However, the IC
card system has encountered resistance from farmers akin
to the Indian farmers’ resistance to metering. This
resistance has not proved to be a major issue in China,
mainly because the IC card system is perceived to be a fair
one. Above all, it drastically reduces wastage of electricity
and water since farmers can see from their IC cards how
much it costs to pump groundwater.
Figure 1. Structure of Chinese Water Administration
and its Funding
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Chinese cities, like other cities in Asia, face
unprecedented groundwater stress levels. The strategy
adopted has been largely one of crowding out of urban tube
wells through imports of water from other areas. In
Shaanxi, all urban tube wells are now closed, resulting in
water tables rising 1 to 1.5 metres annually.
Jiangsu Province adopted a system of importing Yangtze
water from the south of the province to the north, priced
at rates that reflect the need to raise the water levels at five
locations in order to move it to users. However, this had to
be followed up by increasing fees of water permits to levels
higher than that of the raised water, encouraging users to
switch to Yangtze waters. The Jiangsu Provincial Water
Resource Board initiated a campaign to close all urban tube
wells by 2005. As a result of this extensive direct regulation,
the province has since 1995 made a big impact on reducing
urban groundwater depletion, with levels rising up to six
metres per year.
The way forward:  looking at alternatives
South Asian discussions on water reforms need to
incorporate a wider body of experience.  As such, China’s
somewhat unorthodox approaches to solving the country’s
water resource problems could offer some useful pointers.
China could provide valuable lessons in the area of
energy pricing and the groundwater economy as well as
the introduction of incentives to improve the
management of public irrigation systems.  Additionally,
China’s more unified water affairs bureaus may offer an
alternative to the comparatively disjointed administrative
bodies responsible for water management in South Asia.
China too had the experience of a sectoral approach to
water management up until a decade ago, before which
ministries as varied as agriculture, geology and mines
and urban development ran various disparate water
bureaus. China encouraged a service-oriented culture
within its water affairs bureaus, which combined a
business approach with incentivized service provider
models.
Some key factors
China is experimenting with alternatives to the
traditional communitarian model of organization for
managing its small-scale groundwater based irrigation
systems as well as large irrigation projects.
The country experimented with a variety of models of
‘irrigation service providers’ who are incentivized for better
service delivery, improved water use efficiency and better
performance in water fee collection.  In the case of small
scale systems, it is certainly promoting financial
sustainability; in large systems, indications are that
incentivized service providers promote efficient water use,
besides improving fee collection.
North China’s agrarian economy is as precariously
dependent upon high energy use in pumping
groundwater as South Asia’s is. However, the huge
transaction costs of metering a large number of scattered
tubewells has forced South Asia to adopt flat electricity
pricing which is more prone to subsidization, while China,
in a similar situation, has struggled to make metered
electricity supply and full cost recovery work in
agricultural power supply. This has not been easy; but
significant gains seem to have been achieved by
incentivising village electricians to operate as commission
agents of the township electricity bureau.
More recently, many Chinese provinces have been
experimenting with IC pre-paid electricity cards for
agricultural electricity supply. Many Indian states—where
subsidized flat electricity tariff is wrecking groundwater
as well as power economies—are struggling to reintroduce
metering. China’s experience can provide useful guidance
in this direction.
North China has made considerable progress in getting
some control over runaway groundwater overdraft by
using a combination of direct as well as indirect
instruments of demand management such as promotion
of water saving approaches and technologies,
implementation of withdrawal permits, pricing of water
resource as well as services, enforcement of water
withdrawal quotas, and crowding out urban tube wells
by surface water imports. These measures have been more
effective in urban areas than in agriculture, and in
economically more dynamic eastern provinces than in the
agricultural western provinces. However, after years of
regulatory activism, there is growing confidence amongst
the country’s water professionals that they can achieve
their own version of IWRM which, at the ground level,
means:
(a) bringing all water management roles under water
resource bureau structures;
(b) broadening water resource bureau roles by
rechristening them as water affairs bureaus;
(c) instituting a system of water withdrawal permits;
(d) imposing and levying a water resource fee in
addition to water service charges;
(e) countering urban groundwater depletion through
import of surface water from distant projects; and
(f) reorienting its massive water bureaucracy from
water development to resource management mode
rather than by shrinking it.
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